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ABSTRACT-This essay explains why school consolidation issues are especially difficult in rural America. Consolidation
is most appropriate when adjacent districts have similar preferences for taxation and spending on schools. In that case, economies of scale can be reaped without interfering much with resident preferences on taxes and school quality. In urban areas
residents signal these preferences by moving into (or out of) school districts that match their preferences, a process known
as Tiebout sorting. As a result, school consolidation decisions can be based on good information about resident preferences.
The basic claim of this essay is that Tiebout sorting works much less well in rural areas for a variety of reasons. This means
that consolidation decisions are based on thinner information; consequently, school consolidation is more contentious and
political in rural America.
The essay then argues that, given this situation, a legislature interested in exploring rural school consolidation would
do well to consider using legal and political processes that would enhance the ability of residents to express and record their
preferences. Newer forms of political engagement that call on modem technology are available to do this and they may be
effective in this context given the size and level of interest ofthe groups involved.
Key Words: rural schools, consolidation, Tiebout model, taxes, school quality, preferences

INTRODUCTION

School consolidations are efforts to find the "right" size
for a school district. These are always difficult decisions.
S~hools are one of the most important goods provided by
local government because they are highly visible, quite
expensive, and greatly valued. And the size decision has
the potential to affect virtually every aspect of a school
and, in so doing, affect the kind of education children
receive and the cost of providing it. But the decision extends far beyond the walls of the schoolhouse. In addition
to defining who can attend schools and who must pay for
them, a school district's boundaries also define, and indeed create, a community.
This essay explains why school consolidation issues
are especially difficult in rural America. Consolidation
is most appropriate when adjacent districts have similar
preferences for taxation and spending on schools. In that
case, economies of scale can be reaped without interfering much with resident preferences on taxes and school
quality. In urban areas residents signal these preferences
by moving into (or out of) school districts that match their

preferences, a process known as Tiebout sorting. As a result, school consolidation decisions can be based on good
information about resident preferences. The basic claim
of this essay is that Tiebout sorting works much less well
in rural areas for a variety of reasons. This means that
consolidation decisions are based on thinner information;
consequently, school consolidation is more contentious
and political in rural America.l
Drawing on this framework, the essay then explores
ways in which the process of making rural school consolidation decisions could be improved. The general idea is
that structures that provide incentives for residents to reveal their preferences are better than top-down directives.
School consolidation decisions in rural America will always be contentious and political, but there are legal and
political structures than might make them less so.
This essay begins with a description of the basic
Tiebout model and how it operates to expose resident preferences about taxes and school quality. A consideration of
how the model applies to school consolidation decisions
follows. The first-order prediction of the model is that
consolidation is more likely to occur as districts become
more similar to each other. At the extreme, consolidation
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would permit districts with exactly the same preferences
to reap economies of scale without interfering at all with
those preferences. In rural areas, however, the Tiebout
model is less likely to provide reliable information about
resident preferences; rural residents move less often and,
even when they do move, they are less likely to rely heavily on school quality in making their decisions. Finally,
given the limits of Tiebout in the country, the essay proceeds to discuss ways in which rural school consolidation
efforts could be structured to make up for this limitation.
The primary suggestion is that legislatures interested in
rural school consolidation should establish mechanisms
to encourage or require better information disclosure,
perhaps by calling on new forms of political engagement
that use modern technology.
SCHOOLS AND THE TIEBOUT MODEL

In the early 1950s Charles Tiebout was a student in a
graduate seminar on public finance offered by Richard
Musgrave at Michigan. Musgrave, already one of the
lions in the field, described for the class one of public
finance's central problems: determining preferences for
public goods. The general idea was that residents could
not be excluded from enjoying the public goods offered
by a locality, which meant that discovering preferences
through pricing was unavailable and that residents had incentives to be strategically evasive if asked directly about
their preferences. Based on this, Musgrave's position in
the seminar (and in his publications) was that politics was
the only mechanism available for determining the appropriate level of public goods (Musgrave 1939). As the
story goes, Tiebout responded by proposing a nonpolitical alternative in an offhand, maybe even joking manner.
His suggestion was that preferences would be revealed
if localities offered different packages of public goods
and residents revealed their preferences by moving to the
locality that best met their preferences (Fischel 2006, 2).
Some years later Tiebout presented the idea formally in
his short, canonical piece, A Pure Theory ofLocal Expenditures (Tiebout 1956).
What I will call the Tiebout model-residents voting
with their feet for their preferred package of local public
goods-has been a dominant lens through which to view
issues relating to urban and suburban schools. 2 And it
has been an extremely powerful and useful lens. But the
central thesis of this essay is that the lens is not very good
for evaluating rural school consolidation. Instead we are
closer to the original Musgrave hypothesis: that preference revelation is a serious problem and politics, for better
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or worse, is the primary solution. Despite this it is possible
to address the preference revelation problem by structuring the politics of rural school consolidation in certain
ways. This essay will argue that rural school consolidation, while always controversial, could be somewhat more
efficient and less stressful if more attention were paid to
political structure.
First, let us consider the Tiebout model in its normal
application as a way to discover resident preferences for
school quality. The Tiebout story is that people have a
choice of several localities in which to live, and an important consideration in making that choice is how good the
schools are perceived to be. It is not uncommon for people
seeking housing to try to identify good schools first and
then to search for houses in that area. Information about
schools is one set of data regularly provided by realtors
(Waldeck and Glynn 2013). Moreover, when people are
deciding where to live, if the schools in District A are
better than the schools in bordering District B, then they
will be willing to pay more for houses in District A. This
will capitalize the extra value of the better schools into
the price of houses in District A and the lesser value of
the schools in District B into the value of those houses. It
is not uncommon for similar houses sitting on boundaries
such as those between District A and B to have 10% to
20% differences in price (Fischel 2009, 3). Tiebout sorting, then, is a mechanism by which people reveal their
preferences for school quality. By moving into District A
and paying the higher price, they are indicating that they
are willing and able to pay the necessary premium for that
better schooP
This, then, is the Tiebout model as normally applied.
Communities offer a certain quality of school an? people
who value schools will sort into those communities. In
urban America the basic assumptions of the model are
true enough: urban areas provide a variety of communities from which to choose; all are within a reasonable
commuting distance; home buyers tend to be aware of differences between schools in various districts; the population is relatively mobile; zoning provides a mechanism
for communities to limit free riders; and so on (Fischel
2001, 58-71). The literature supporting the model is voluminous and highly sophisticated. This is not the place
to provide a full-blown review (for a good recent review,
see Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger 2011). Suffice it to say here
that the Tiebout model is not perfect (What model is?), but
it does a pretty good job of describing reality-or, as one
clever commentator put it, the model does a good job of
describing both realty and one of its oldest sayings about
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what is important: location, location, location (Fischel
200l, 71). Maybe the saying should have been "Location,
location, schools."
The Tiebout model is primarily about decisions to live
in one district or another, and the consequences of those
decisions for housing prices and school quality. One of
Tiebout's original (but implicit) assumptions was that
district boundaries were set endogenously, which would
then permit people to choose between districts based on
the packages of public goods and taxes offered. 4 But this
is an essay about school district consolidation; it is about
how the boundary lines are set and reset, not about how
people decide to move across them after they are set. Less
work has been done on this issue and, as far as I know,
no work has been done considering rural school districts
specifically (Brasington 2003a, 2003b; Saiger 2010).
TIEBOUT AND SCHOOL CONSOLIDATION

Let us begin with a simple model of school consolidation.
There are two neighboring school districts. Each provides
a certain level of schools at a particular price to their respective populations. The two districts can remain separate or consolidate to form a single district. Consolidation
requires a positive vote from both districts. 5
The Tiebout model helps us to think about what kinds
of factors might predict consolidation. The first-order
prediction is that consolidation is more likely as the two
di.stricts become more similar. In the extreme, if the two
districts were identical in their size, school quality, taxes,
and so on (which would imply identical preferences by the
populations), then economies of scale would favor consolidation. 6 This implies that current trends toward more uniformity across a variety of dimensions (such as curriculum
requirements and funding formulas) point toward more
consolidations (Common Core n.d.; Nebraska Department
of Education 2013; National Access Network 2013).
Another way in which districts may become more similar would be through changing demographics. The Tiebout
model recognizes that each district will comprise people
with differing preferences. This means that some subset of
residents will always be dissatisfied. Indeed, the main moving part in the model-its main insight-is that dissatisfied
residents will move from their district to another that better meets their preferences. This is the way in which residents reveal their preferences for a community's proffered
package of school quality and taxes. But as those residents
move the median voter in the district may shift up or down.7
Obviously this could mean that the district moves further

away from neighboring districts in its preferred package
of schools and taxes, but it could mean that it becomes
closer to a neighboring district. Again, if it becomes close
enough, economies of scale would support consolidation.
Tiebout recognized that moving between districts was
costly and that this would affect the extent to which his
model would reveal preferences (Tiebout 1956, 422). At
the extreme, if it was always too expensive for residents
to move from one district to another, then no preferences
for schools and taxes would be revealed under the model.
Tiebout cautioned against blowing this out of proportion because, as he rightly pointed out, every market has
transaction costs. But he recognized that as this cost goes
up, the less effective his model will be at revealing preferences (Tiebout 1956,422).
The first-order prediction depends on economies of
scale. But as school districts become larger in geographic
size or more distant from one another, diseconomies
of those types of scale may outweigh other economies
of scale that might be created by consolidation. Thus a
school district in Kimball County in western Nebraska
may have residents with exactly the same preferences as
a school district in Douglas County in eastern Nebraska,
but the geographic distance between the two would undoubtedly overwhelm any other economies of scale that
might be achieved through consolidation. This may also
be the case with contiguous districts that are very large in
geographic size.
Finally, school consolidation entails an issue beyond school quality that may function differently and
more powerfully in rural areas. In addition to providing
schooling, schools create communities. Rural districts
may resist consolidation not so much because they fear
that school quality will decline, but rather because they
fear that their sense of community will deteriorate. 8 This
tends to be an especially powerful consideration in rural
areas. In urban areas, if District A and B combine in the
M metropolitan area, the M community is unchanged.
The A and B communities will change but both still have
their identities as members of the M community and both
expect to survive in the new AlB District, even if in a
somewhat different form. Things are often different in
rural areas, where the school district and metropolitan
areas are the same and the stakes are higher:
When death comes to a small town, the school is
usually the last thing to go. A place can lose its
bank, its tavern, its grocery store, its shoe shop.
But when the school closes, you might as well put
a fork in it. (Egan 2003)9
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I do not mean to imply here that the community aspects of a school are not valued in urban areas; in fact,
there is good evidence from Tiebout sorting that that type
of value is attached to urban schools (see note 11). But
the community aspects of schools are likely to be even
more salient in rural areas where the number and variety
of community attachments are fewer, thus increasing the
relative value of school as community.
All of these factors indicate that the Tiebout process
for revealing preferences will work less well in rural areas. First, the main moving part in the model is less likely
to move in rural areas. In suburban America a resident can
often signal her preference for a particular school quality
by living on one side of the street or the other. In rural
America the distances are much greater; hence the cost of
registering the preference is higher, so the model works
less well. 1O Second, even when rural residents move they
are less likely to be signaling their preference for school
quality. In urban areas, again, the decision to live on one
side of the street or the other may be primarily driven by
perceived school quality; other factors, such as commuting time and access to shopping, are equal on either side
of the street. In rural areas the converse is true. The locational decision is more likely to be driven by nonschool
factors such as the location of the family farm, land prices, or the availability of work for migrant laborers. Moving to signal school quality is rare and difficult. Third, in
rural areas, even if two adjacent districts are identical in
their preferences for the school/tax tradeoff, the economies of scale that might be reaped by consolidation may
be outweighed by the diseconomies of scale created by
geographic distance. Finally, in urban areas, Tiebout sorting can also function to provide a measure of the extent to
which a district's residents value the community aspects
of a school. " But because of the other problems with the
model in rural areas, that valuation signal is unavailable
in the country even though the value placed on community is likely to be considerably higher in rural areas.'2
Since all of these factors conspire against a well-functioning Tiebout model in rural areas, we simply cannot
know much about resident preferences for school quality
based on Tiebout sorting. This returns us to the Musgrave
hypothesis-there is no quasi-market based way to determine rural resident preferences for school quality. Instead
it is inherently a political process. This interferes with
the consolidation process because it makes it more difficult to evaluate whether adjacent districts have similar
preferences about school quality or the strength of each
district's preference for the community-building aspects
of their schoolsY
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TIEBOUT IN THE COUNTRY:
THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF
RURAL SCHOOL CONSOLIDATION

As the preceding discussion indicates, determining preferences is a major problem in rural America. In particular, the Tiebout model, which does a decent enough job
of revealing preferences in urban America, just does not
work very well in the country. Given this, the principal
goals in structuring rural consolidation efforts should be
to encourage or require information disclosure and then
to establish mechanisms to permit that information to be
acted upon in a timely and reasonable way.
In general terms, there are only two ways to structure rural school consolidation efforts. First, the state (or
some other higher authority, such as a court) can simply
mandate consolidation. This approach has been used in
Nebraska and Arkansas, among other places. '4 Second,
the state can create incentives to encourage rural school
districts to consolidate voluntarily. This is another strategy that has been used in Nebraska (Blauwkamp et al.
2011,5-6), as well as other places (see Rural School and
Community Trust 2006; Remsen 2010).
MANDATED CONSOLIDATION

The first option-mandated consolidation-is an especially problematic structure in rural America. The reasons the structure is especially problematic in the country
can be illustrated by comparing the problems there to two
situations in which mandated consolidation might occur
in urban America.
One situation in which mandated consolidation might
occur in urban America is when Tiebout sorting works
too well-that is, when it results in sorting on criteria
that society has deemed to be improper or questionable.
For example, boundaries may be drawn and maintained
in ways that maintain racial or socioeconomic separation
(Saiger 2010; Brasington 2003a).'5 In these situations, if
the racial or socioeconomic separation is found to be illegal, courts may order consolidation even if neither of the
districts consents. l6
In this situation Tiebout sorting may provide a good
window into the value people place on the particular district boundaries and part ofthat valuation, by assumption,
is based on preferences for racial or socioeconomic separation. Houses on opposite sides of the boundary might
be priced quite differently. If consolidation is ordered,
people on the high-value side of the boundary are likely
to suffer capital losses as well as other disappointments.
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There are two reasons that this type of mandated consolidation in urban America is distinguishable from and
less problematic than mandated consolidation in rural
America. First, in this type of urban consolidation the
reason consolidation is required does not have to do with
valuation at all. Instead society has determined that certain preferences, such as those based on race, are improper and should be disregarded. 17 This situation (where the
valuations are known but disregarded for important reasons) is quite different than a normal rural consolidation
situation where the consolidation cannot be justified for
reasons independent of school quality and tax valuations.
In the urban consolidation situation mandated consolidation is required for a good, known, and identified reason
(such as addressing racial segregation) independent of any
evaluation of legitimate (nonracial) resident preferences.
Moreover, even if the legitimate resident preferences were
to be credited in this circumstance, they would be difficult to assess with Tiebout sorting or otherwise because
they are so conflated with the illegitimate preferences. In
the case of rural consolidation, in contrast, there are no
disregarded preferences and, thus, no independent justifications for mandated school consolidation. The mandated
consolidation will be justified based on valuations of
school quality and taxes (broadly construed) or not at all.
Mandated urban consolidation in these circumstances
is also less problematic than mandated rural consolidation because it is easier to escape the consequences. For
better or worse, if residents subject to the mandated urban
consolidation do not like the new school district, other
options are available. For example, other districts may be
available in the metropolitan area, or there may be private
schools, or there may be a sufficient critical mass of parents to begin a charter school (Kruse 2007). None of these
options for avoiding the effects of an unpopular decision
are likely to be available with rural school consolidation.
Annexation is another situation in which consolidation might be required in urban America. By annexation
I mean a situation in which there are two neighboring
school districts, but one is much larger than the other. The
classic case would be a growing city that has rapidly growing suburbs at its fringes. The city and a particular suburban district can remain separate or consolidate to form a
single district. But in the annexation situation, consolidation requires a positive vote only from the larger district. 18
The first-order condition discussed above indicates
that if the two districts have the same preferences for
school quality and taxes, then both would prefer consolidation because of economies of scale. The available
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social scientific evidence suggests, however, that the size
difference alone would result in the larger district being
more inclined to consolidate and the smaller one being
less inclined (Brasington 2003b; Ellingsen 1998). The
question, then, is why an annexation system would permit
the larger school district to absorb the smaller without the
latter's consent and, indeed, even though the latter might
be inclined not to consent.
Theoretically the question asks what effect the relative
size of districts might have on the consolidation decision.
There are at least two possible justifications for limiting
the ability of the smaller district to block consolidation.
First, the benefits of education may spill over positively
into neighboring communities. Especially in an urban
area, residents beyond the district's boundaries may enjoy
benefits from good education through greater workforce
productivity, a better-educated regional and statewide electorate, and a stronger regional community (Wyckoff 1984;
Brasington 2003b). Since larger districts produce more of
this externalized public good, smaller communities may
attempt to free ride on it and, hence, resist consolidation.
Thus, permitting the larger district to force consolidation
is a way of addressing this free rider problem.
Second, the residents of the smaller district may be
more concerned about dilution of their political power
and status than they are about the school quality/tax
tradeoff. In one sense this is a legitimate concern; their
political power to influence educational policy in the future likely will be reduced once they are absorbed into a
larger district. But in another sense it is an illegitimate,
or at least an indeterminate, consideration. Viewed from
the perspective of the entire metropolitan area, crediting
this consideration would permit the minority in the small
district to veto the will of the majority in the broader
district. Placing the authority to make the consolidation
decision with the larger district limits this veto option and
is more likely to align with normal majoritarian principles
(Briffault 1990, 356-82).
By reciting these justifications for annexation, I do not
mean to imply that they are always persuasive. There certainly are countervailing factors. For example, the larger
district may annex to exploit an adjacent small district
with high property values and a low school-age population. And entrusting the larger district with the annexation
decision permits it, and not the smaller district, to define
the contours of the community created by the school district. But there are generally legal limits on the authority
to annex that deal with the former problem and there is
simply no good answer to the question of who should be
entitled to define a community (Reynolds 1992).
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But for our purposes the interesting part of this message is that, again, annexation is a situation in which
Tiebout sorting may provide us with information about
preferences in the two districts, but we choose to ignore
it. That is, in our prototypical situation of an urban district absorbing an outlying suburb, it may well be that the
smaller and larger districts have quite different preferences on school quality and taxes and that those differences
are reflected well in property values. It may be that a house
on the small district side of the current boundary is worth
considerably more than a house on the large district side
because of differences in school quality. If so, annexation
may well result in a capital loss, and yet that is permitted,
in part for the reasons discussed above. Thus, as with consolidations required for racial or socioeconomic reasons,
annexations are situations in which valuation information may well be known, but it is ignored (or in this case,
overridden) by other factors. This, again, is quite different
from the situation with rural school consolidation, where
there are no justifications for the consolidation decision
independent of valuation and efficiency.
In sum, mandated consolidation seems particularly
problematic in rural America. Mandated consolidation
may make sense in some situations in urban America
because the consolidations depend primarily on factors
other than valuation, such as racial or socioeconomic equity. In contrast, in rural America, the primary concern
driving consolidation is valuation and efficiency. As a
result, valuation information is central. Mandated consolidation is especially problematic, then, because it does
nothing to try to force preference revelation even though
the decision is largely based on an assessment of those
preferences; instead it requires consolidation in the absence of that information. It would be preferable to devise
legal structures that provide a better informational base
for making rural consolidation decisions.
VOLUNTARY CONSOLIDATION

The second way to structure rural school consolidation
efforts is to create incentives to encourage rural school
districts to consolidate voluntarily. The dividing line
between this category and mandatory consolidation can
be indistinct. Rural schools can sometimes be heard to
complain that the incentives are so powerful that consolidation is the only possible option (Rural School and Community Trust 2006). It can be very difficult to determine
when the incentives become that powerful, but when they
do, regardless of the labels placed on the scheme, they
flip from this category into the mandatory consolidation
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category. However, there are also examples of very soft
incentives. For example, under a recent Vermont statute,
the only incentive was that "school districts must discuss
merger with ... contiguous districts, vote on whether to
pursue a comprehensive analysis of merger, and report the
results ... to the commissioner of education and voters"
(Remsen 2010). Despite these difficulties, in concept this
category is clear enough-the voluntary consolidation
category contemplates a legal structure that encourages
consolidation, but does not require it.
To consider this situation, let us begin with a model
of school consolidation that, although still bare bones,
is slightly more complex than the one considered above.
Assume again that there are two neighboring school districts, each currently providing a certain level of schools
at a particular price to their respective populations. The
state then acts to provide a certain set of incentives to
consolidate. As before the two districts can remain separate or consolidate to form a single district. Since this is
voluntary consolidation, the two districts would retain the
authority to make this decision. We will also assume that
we are operating in a Musgravian rather than a Tieboutian
world-that is, all information about preferences on issues
such as school quality and tax levels must occur through
political voice rather than through the kinds of movements
between school districts described by Tiebout.
This model conceptualizes the voluntary consolidation process as a repeated two-stage game. First the state
acts to announce the consolidation incentives. This would
normally be done by the legislature which, as described
below, would have to choose among many possibilities.
Once the incentives have been set by the legislature,
school districts would decide whether to consolidate or
not based on that set of incentives. At this second stage
of the process, it could be that many school districts decide to consolidate or that few or none do. This two-stage
process could be repeated: in a subsequent legislative
session, the legislature may act again to establish a new
set of incentives, which would restart the process. In a
Tieboutian world, this repeated two-stage process may
work acceptably because Tiebout sorting provides a great
deal of information to both the state and school districts
about the preferences of residents on schools and taxes.
The problem in a Musgravian world is that those preferences are not known and, by itself, this process does little
to create the kinds of information that are necessary to
make good decisions.
Consider first the decision of the state in setting the
consolidation incentives. Again the problem in a Musgravian world is that the state has to set these incentives
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without much information. This problem is heightened
because the incentives can be set in a wide variety of ways.
For example, states might establish incentives through reduced funding for certain categories of districts, through
financial bonuses for districts that consolidate, by increasing curricular requirements that are difficult for
smaller districts to meet, by increasing teacher credential
requirements, by establishing certain student transportation rules or funding schemes, by imposing limits on distance learning, by imposing certain capital requirements,
and so on (Rural School and Community Trust 2006). At
the first stage in this two-step process the state will set
all of these parameters explicitly or implicitly. There are
literally thousands of possible configurations of consolidation incentives. But the state can choose only one set of
incentives out of all those possibilities.
The second stage, then, will be for each set of rural school districts to evaluate the one set of incentives
proffered by the state and then to choose whether to
consolidate. It could be that no school districts decide to
consolidate or that many do. 19 But the information provided by the second stage will be limited: given this particular
set of consolidation incentives (out of the thousands theoretically available), we know that X school districts will
agree to consolidate and that Y school districts will choose
not to consolidate. Since this is a repeated two-stage game,
the state will then be able to rely on this limited set of information to recalibrate its consolidation incentives for the
second round. And the process starts again.
Given the limits of Tiebout sorting in the country, efforts to encourage voluntary school consolidation should
be structured differently than this with the goal of encouraging more and better information disclosure, followed
by a process which permits consolidation decisions to be
made based on that improved information.
Let us think first about the second stage of the process.
Each school district is provided with a set of incentives
and is then given an opportunity to decide to consolidate or not. Consider possible ways in which a fuller
information base could be developed. First, following
the Vermont statute, rather than merely being offered a
set of incentives, school districts could be required affirmatively to consider consolidation (Remsen 2010). This
would mean that a more complete and representative set
of districts would provide reactions to the incentives, even
if the ultimate signal remains merely a yes or no to consolidation. Without forced consideration one would not
know if a nonconsolidating district simply failed to think
much about the issue or whether it had thought about it
seriously and rejected it. Forced consideration would ad-
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dress that informational limitation. 20 In addition, requiring each district to talk to at least one other district about
consolidation would produce more, better, and more representative cross-district information.
Second, school districts could be required to engage in
a process that would provide even more information about
the reasons for their consolidation decision. Since we are
talking about rural school consolidation, the populations
involved would be relatively small and the interest and
motivation to participate would probably be quite high.
This would mean that techniques could be employed that
would extend beyond the district leadership (such as the
superintendent and school board) to gather information at
a more grassroots level. Many possibilities are available.
Traditional general-invitation town halls are one possibility, but more modern and innovative techniques may be
even better at discovering true preferences. 21 For example,
deliberative polling is a structured process to discover and
shape public opinion that would likely work well in small,
rural communities. 22 Similarly, more statistically based
"idea pageants" are a way of exploring the types of tradeoffs preferred by a population (Marinovic et al. 2011).
There are many other possibilities and variations (Hanson
2007; Hahn and Tetlock 2005, 2006). In the abstract, it is
difficult to know which particular preference-revealing
strategies might work best for rural school consolidation. 23
But the general point here is that techniques are available
that could be used to uncover much more information
about a district's preferences than a mere up or down vote
on consolidation by the school board.
The advantages of requiring targeted local school
districts to engage in a preference-revealing process like
this flow in several different directions. First, the process
would help the school district population itself discover
and explore its own preferences. A well-designed process
would provide more information about the decision to be
made and structure and encourage a productive discussion. In the absence of a process like this, opinions are
likely to be formed on a thinner information base and
with fewer discussions across various community divisions (such as religious or ethnic divisions). Second, and
similarly, the school board may find that the views it has
formed through informal contacts and the normal political process are confirmed through a more informed and
broader deliberative process. Or it may discover that some
of those views should be revised. In either event, it could
be more confident that its decision, whatever it is, is more
data-based and closer to the popular will. Third, the accumulation ofthe information from these processes could
be gathered to help inform the state when it considers its
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options for the next round. As indicated above, the state's
consolidation offer can be configured in multiple ways.
The kinds of information gathered through these processes can assist in the configuration for the next round.
I will discuss this further below. Finally, there is good
evidence that deliberative processes like these increase
trust and confidence in governmental decision-making
(Tomkins et al. 20lO). Thus, even if every consolidation
decision turns out to be exactly the same with or without deliberative processes like these (which would, of
course, be impossible to know), the process itself may
produce important benefits. These benefits may be especially important in an era when trust and confidence in
government is at historically low levels. This may be especially important when the issue at hand is rural school
consolidation. This is an issue that is especially likely to
undermine mutual trust and confidence in government.
In particular, rural school districts may be especially distrustful of both the state and its initial offer and of other,
neighboring school districts. In this context some level of
distrust like this is inevitable. But, again, a well-designed
deliberative process should help to minimize the distrust
and skepticism.
Let us turn our attention back to the first stage of the
two-stage process: development of the consolidation offer
from the state. Again this is a repeated two-stage game,
so we are thinking about the first stage after at least one
second stage has already occurred. The information from
a preference-revealing process at the second stage can
be used productively to inform the next first-stage offer.
For example, the state might discover that carrots such
as financial incentives to consolidate were viewed much
more favorable than sticks such as state aid reductions for
schools that did not consolidate (Dari-Mattiacci and de
Geest 20lO). Or it might find that school districts might
be more willing to replace cutbacks to transportation subsidies to ensure shorter bus rides than they are to replace
reductions in state support for other kinds of district expenses. Or it may find the opposite on both these dimensions. In any event the new information can help inform
the next consolidation offer made by the state.
There are at least two ways in which the first-stage
process can be organized to facilitate better use of the
new, richer information gathered at the second stage.
Both involve administrative processes. First, if the second-stage processes work, there will be a great deal of
new data and much of it will be difficult to interpret. The
information could be put to better use at the first stage if
someone is assigned the task of organizing and analyzing
it. The legislature itself, given the demands on its time and
resources, is poorly positioned to do a good job of this it-
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self. Thus the information would be better used if the task
of using the new information to develop a new legislative
offer were assigned to an agency. Because rural school
districts are likely to have some level of distrust of such
an agency, it is important to structure the agency and its
processes in ways that will build rather than undermine
trust. For example, structuring the agency to be multimember and representative would probably be preferable
to having a department with a single head. Similarly,
this may be the type of situation in which nonstandard
administrative processes, such as negotiated rulemaking
processes, could be used to help build trust (See, e.g., the
2012 Negotiated Rulemaking Act [5 USC §§ 561 et seq.]).
Second, there is little reason to think that each rural
school district will weigh each component in the legislature's consolidation offer in the same way. Some may be
more interested in capital construction issues, others in
transportation issues, others in teacher credentialing, and
so on. Thus, any consolidation offer that is uniform and
informed by the legislature's best estimate of the marginal preferences of the marginal district is destined to be
inferior to offers that could be more finely calibrated to
individual districts. This points to agencies again. If one
of the goals is maximizing preferences across a number of
diverse school districts, then one could get closer to that
goal if an agency were provided ranges on a variety of
the relevant parameters (such as transportation subsidies,
capital investment rules, or teacher credential rules) and
given the flexibility to adjust each parameter to match
district preferences more closely. This would, of course,
be a difficult process, but avoiding difficulty is not possible with rural school consolidation. The issue would
be whether this type of administrative matching process
would be more or less difficult and effective than a onesize-fits-all consolidation offer. To ensure sufficient trust
on the part of rural school districts to permit such a system to work, a properly structured agency and thoughtful
administrative processes would be crucially important.
In sum, the basic problem with voluntary rural school
consolidation is that we are living in a Musgravian world
in which it is difficult to discover true preferences. There
are no perfect solutions to this problem. But it may be
possible to develop legal and political structures for dealing with rural school consolidation that do a better job of
preference revelation.
CONCLUSION

Rural school consolidation efforts are especially fraught
in part because information about resident preferences
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regarding school quality and taxes are so hard to discover.
The Tiebout process that works moderately well to provide that type of information in urban America just does
not work very well in the country. As a result, the process
occurs in a Musgravian world in which the information
can be uncovered only through political voice. In light of
this, if a legislature is interested in exploring rural school
consolidation, it would do well to consider using legal
and political processes that would enhance the ability of
residents to express and record their preferences. Newer
forms of political engagement that call on modern technology are available to do this, and they may be effective
in this context given the size and level of interest of the
groups involved. At the least they may be worth a try
both to permit real-world evaluation of these techniques
and, more specifically, to see whether they would be effective in addressing the special problems of rural school
consolidation.
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NOTES
I. I use the word "political" here in a technical sense. Although the word has acquired a pejorative tone in recent years,
I do not use it in that way at all. Instead, following Hirschman's
classic formulation, I use the term to mean that rural consolidation issues are more likely to be sorted out through political
"voice" rather than through Tieboutian "exit" (Hirschman 1970).
2. One of the leading researchers on American schools has
said that the Tiebout process is "the most powerful force in
American schooling" (Hoxby 2000, 1209).
3. Because this is an essay about school consolidation, I will
often simplify the decision set for residents as one involving
school quality and taxes. Obviously the set is much broader and
more complicated than that.
4. Tiebout recognized district formation as a problem. He
noted that unless a "sociological variable" were included in
his model, the model could be perfectly solved if there were a
separate municipality for each person, which would be absurd
(or, as he put it, "trite") (Tiebout 1956,421). But, despite this,
he did not attempt to incorporate these "sociological" variables
into his model.
5. Some obvious complicating factors have been stripped
from this model to keep it simple. For example, consolidation contemplates a wholesale integration of the two districts.
Instead of that, the two districts could engage in a more finetuned collaboration by contracting to share only certain func-
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tions. This would complicate the model by moving from an all
or nothing choice set (consolidation or not) to a much broader
choice set with many possible levels of consolidation. This is
obviously a possibility; Nebraska's educational service units
and the Learning Community of Douglas and Sarpy Counties
are local examples of such, more fine-tuned collaborations (See
Rural School and Community Trust 2013; Deloitte 2005). But
those complications are for other articles; the goal in this short
essay is to keep the model simple and manageable.
6. One study found that in the mid-1990s, consolidations
in New York reduced costs per pupil by 28% for a 300-pupil
district and by 9% for a 1,500-pupil district (Duncombe and
Yinger 2005). See also Cogswell (2009, 66), who finds that the
average per-pupil cost in a set of Nebraska small schools was
18.6% higher than the state average between 2003 and 2006. But
see Dority and Thompson (2013), who did not find consistent
evidence that consolidation lowered per pupil monetary costs,
in either rural or non-rural districts in Nebraska.
7. In theory a district's preferences reflect those of the median voter (Bergstrom and Goodman 1973).
8. If consolidation is possible, the first-order condition
would imply that preferences about school quality are similar.
9. This article in the New York Times used Superior, Nebraska, as its primary example. I do not mean to imply here that
the community aspects of a school are not valued in urban areas;
in fact there is good evidence from Tiebout sorting that that type
of value is attached to urban schools. See note 11, below. But
the community aspects of schools are likely to be more salient
in rural areas where the number and variety of community attachments are fewer, thus increasing the relative value of school
as community.
10. Some states and districts have implemented open enrollment policies that enhance the ability of residents to signal
their preferences. These policies permit residents to choose
any school within a district or even across districts (McClureHartman 2012). But these types of open-enrollment policies are
not very effective at signaling preferences in rural areas. First,
many rural districts have only one elementary school and one
high school, so intra-district open enrollment is simply unavailable as a mechanism to signal preferences. Second, even where
possible (for example, through inter-district open enrollment),
the distances involved in rural areas raise the cost of making
the choice, so the signal about school quality is much weaker.
II. For example, there is some evidence that home values
in good urban school districts are "too high" relative to the
value added by the schools. This overcapitalization could be
explained by the extra value residents see in the types of communities that form around those good schools (Bayer et al. 2007;
Rothstein 2006). Similarly, one explanation for why residents
without children tend to support public schools is that they value
the benefits they receive from the communities that are formed
by those attracted into good school districts through Tiebout
sorting (Fischel 2009). Alternatively, it could be that residents
without children are just really interested in maintaining the
value of their houses. (Hilber and Mayer 2009).
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The notion that good schools can create good communities
can help to explain observations like these that would be fairly
puzzling otherwise.
12. All of the factors discussed in this paragraph depend on
an admittedly rough distinction between rural and urban areas.
But, of course, the distinction between the two is not sharp
(Morrill et al. 1999). Consequently, Tiebout sorting may work
reasonably well in some rural areas and not very well in some
urban areas, depending on the particular circumstances.
13. Note that it is not only difficult for state officials to evaluate these types of preferences, but it is also difficult for the rural
residents themselves to evaluate them. As a result, the necessarily political process for sorting them out creates pressure
within rural school districts as well as between those districts
and state officials.
14. In 2005 Nebraska required all Nebraska school districts to offer grades from kindergarten through high school.
In effect, this required all Class I districts (those with only
elementary schools) and Class 6 districts (those with only high
schools) to consolidate with neighboring districts. The law was
later overturned by referendum, but not before many districts
were consolidated (Blauwkamp et al. 2011, 4-5). In 2004, Arkansas enacted a law which required 57 school districts with
fewer than 350 students to merge with neighboring districts
(Jimerson 2005).
15. The prototypical cases involving racial separation are
the desegregation cases deriving from Brown v. Board of Education (347 US 483 [1954]). The prototypical cases involving
socioeconomic separation are the school finance cases (Thro
1990).
16. As above, this description of the situation is simplified
to facilitate discussion. The real world is much more nuanced.
For example, inter-district remedies are permissible only if
an inter-district violation is shown (Missouri v. Jenkins [515
US 70 (1995)]). The school finance cases are, by their nature,
inter-district; the desegregation cases, on the other hand, are
more commonly intra-district. For an inter-district desegregation case, see United States v. Yonkers Board ofEducation (624
F. Supp. 1276, aff'd, 837 F.2d 1182 [1985]). Similarly, in both
desegregation and school finance cases, when they find violations, the courts are more likely to order a remedy other than
full consolidation, such as the establishment of magnet schools
or busing or transfer programs in desegregation cases, Liddell v.
Board of Education of City of St. Louis (126 F.3d 1049 [1997]),
or new state funding schemes in school finance cases. Despite
this, consolidation is one of the possible remedies in these cases
when inter-district violations are found.
17. Disregarding preferences is not an uncontroversial topic
in itself. But it is one beyond the scope of this essay (Sun stein
1986; Elster 1983).
18. This is a limited definition of annexation designed to
permit exploration of certain issues. The definition is a very
abstract description of some annexation systems, but these
systems vary greatly across the country and some require the
consent of both districts. Compare, for example, Hamilton v.
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Country Board of Education of Johnson County (265 SW.2d
873 [1954)) (discussing Arkansas law which required only the
consent of the larger district) with Live Oak County Board
of School Trustees v. Whitsett Common School District (181
S.W.2d 846 [1944)) (discussing Texas law which required an
election of all those to be included in the combined district)
with Southern Pacific Co. v. Maricopa County (107 P.2d 212
[1940)) (discussing Arizona law which required consent of both
districts). In general, the state has plenary authority to decide
the procedures required for annexation (Schools and School
Districts [Corpus Juris Secundum, § 18 (2012))).
19. It is worth noting that this process provides a bias against
consolidating. School districts are generally permitted only a
choice of consolidating or not consolidating. A deconsolidate
option is generally not available.
20. Forced consideration, without dictating a particular
result, has been used in other areas successfully (National
Labor Relations Act [29 USC §§ 151-69], 1935, § § 8[§158](a)
(5), 8[§158] (b)(3) [imposing a duty to bargain on unions and
employers)).
21. General invitation public hearings have been used commonly by school boards considering rural consolidation. Ironically the social scientific evidence is that such hearings tend to
increase polarization rather than to lead to consensus. More innovative techniques have been found to be better for exploring
preferences (Glaeser and Sunstein 2009; Schkade 2007).
22. This is a technique developed by Professor James S.
Fishkin at Stanford University, and described on his website:
A random, representative sample is first polled on the
targeted issues. After this baseline poll, members of the
sample are invited to gather at a single place for a weekend in order to discuss the issues. Carefully balanced
briefing materials are sent to the participants and are
also made publicly available. The participants engage
in dialogue with competing experts and political leaders
based on questions they develop in small group discussions with trained moderators. Parts of the weekend
events are broadcast on television, either live or in taped
and edited form. After the deliberations, the sample is
again asked the original questions. The resulting changes in opinion represent the conclusions the public would
reach, if people had opportunity to become more informed and more engaged by the issues. (Fishkin 20\3)
23. Researchers are beginning to explore which preferencerevealing strategy might work best for what purposes (PytlikZillig and Tomkins 2011). A great deal of expertise on these
types of issues is locally available at the Public Policy Center at
the University of Nebraska.
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